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Abstract 
This paper examines the ownership concentration and structure, and analyzes its impact on firm productive efficiency. A 
stochastic frontier model with inefficiency effects is fitted to an unbalanced panel dataset of 31 government-linked companies 
(GLCs) listed at Malaysia’s Stock Exchange (Bursa Malaysia) over a period of 12 years (2001-2012). The results of the analysis 
reveal the government’s shareholdings have significantly improve productive efficiency over time, although the link is weak. The 
insignificant positive link between ownership concentration and inefficiency, and between board ownership and inefficiency, 
imply high ownership concentration and board ownership are not effective corporate governance mechanism in improving 
efficiency.Although there is a strong evidence to show government ownership is positively related to productive efficiency, 
having high ownership concentration tend to influence inefficiency, concurring earlier studies that highly concentrated 
shareholding with complex pyramidal and cross-holdings ownership can signal underlying performance vulnerability in the long 
run.The study also observes that gradual but slow improvement in the GLCs efficiency levels, and that output generation has 
been labour-using and capital-saving over time. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
A firm’s ownership structure is considered one of the key influences in corporate governance (CG) system 
(Abdul Rahman, 2006). Chorus of studies on the impact of ownership structure have found mixed results depending 
on how performance is defined and measured1. And while voluminous literature focuses attention on the link 
between ownership structure and firm performance, studies relating its impact on productive efficiency are still 
minimal. Hence, our paper addresses this issue by examining the relationship between ownership concentration and 
variations on ownership, with economic efficiency. Analyzing this connection is particularly important because 
economic-based efficiency measures are reasonable indicators of long-term health and prospects of a given firm 
(Baek and Jose, 2003). We use the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) with technical inefficiency effects model on 
samples of firms that represent partially privatized firms where government ownership is still prominent. The GLCs 
are used as the unit of analysis as they are the key market drivers in the Malaysian economy. Currently, the listed 
GLCs constitute almost a third of the total market capitalization and their economic dominance felt in almost all 
industries (Menon and Ng, 2013). 
 
2.  Ownership Concentration, Government Ownership and Managerial Ownership: A brief Review 
Public entities going private is generally accepted to perform better, be it profitably or efficiency.  In most cases, 
privatization should replace political control with private control by outside investors. However, a privatized firm as 
a business entity can be linked to agency problem, as the investors may not be assured of better governance and 
performance due to theseparation of ownership and control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Previous literature that 
studied the link between ownership structure and the performance of partially privatized firms, have been mixed. 
For instance, a study conducted on the role of state-owned holding company (SOH)in Singapore finds SOH serves 
as a useful institution to mitigate the agency problem involving the government as the principal and the GLCs as 
agents (Choon-Yin, 2008), thus, suggesting that the governance styles of the SOH can ensure the success of GLCs.It 
is also argued that the effects of changes in CG and restructurings are considered key contributing factor in an effort 
by many countries’ government to reconfigure the firms’ post privatization performance (D'Souza et al., 2007). 
Meanwhile, a study on Malaysian GLCs findsthe government involvement do have a positive significant 
relationship on performance (Najid andRahman, 2011), which contradicts the argument that the economic problems 
in most East Asian countries has been caused by government intervention. The study however, observes that the 
GLCs corporate performance (both financial and market) is relatively lower than the non GLCs.  
Empirical evidences relating ownership concentration and structure, to firm performance tend to give mixed 
results as well(Boycko et al., 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Claessens and Djankov, 1999; Dyck, 2001; D'Souza 
et al., 2000; Simoneti and Gregoric, 2004; Boubakri et al., 2005; D’Souza et al., 2007; Boubakri et al., 2013; Hassan 
et al., 2014).Firms are found to prosper primarily because of concentrated ownership structures resulting from 
privatization (Claessens and Djankov, 1999). However, privatization of firms itself, involves changes in CG due to 
changes in ownership and further re-shuffles government structure by providing ownership to employees and 
foreigners (D’Souza et al, 2007). It was observed that that although concentrated ownership through shareholdings 
can be effective in solving the agency problem, it may also inefficiently redistribute wealth from other investors to 
themselves(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Several studies argue CGpractices can influence the performance of 
privatized firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Dyck, 2001) while others argue higher gains in performance are 
expected when the government gives up control (Boycko et al., 1996).  Most governments in Asia are found not to 
totally relinquish their control in newly privatized firms, (Boubakri et al, 2004).  This led to the idea that giving up a 
small stake of state to private ownership can be seen as continuing government interference and possible 
denationalization, which will affect inefficiency. However, stronger profitability gains are found in firms with 
higher state ownership, stronger output gains in firms in competitive industries and firms in countries with faster 
growing economies (D’Souza et al., 2000). A study conducted on newly privatized firms in Malaysia observes 
increased linkages between ownership and CG with such performance changes (Sun & Tong, 2002). Private 
and employee ownership however, are found to have a positive impact on return on assets and output.And it 
 
 
1Abdul Rahman, R (2006) provides reviews on ownership structure and performance of firms around the whole, including Malaysia. 
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was found thatfirms with high ownership concentration experience higher efficiency compared to firms with low 
ownership concentration, thus signals the need for Malaysian firms to enhance their CG practices to improve 
efficiency and to protect the interest of the minority investors (Hassan et al., 2014).It is also argued that ownership 
alone is not enough and that major shareholders, such as government owned institutional investors need to be 
involved in order to be effective in monitoring earnings management (Abdul Jalil and Abdul Rahman, 2011).  
And contrary to adverse public perception on Malaysian GLCs, Lau and Tong (2008) find that there is a 
significant positive link between government ownership and firm value. The study argues that although GLCs’ 
goals are divided into maximizing investors’ wealth and fulfilling the country’s social and national interest, 
better governance should be given due priority in order to create firm value.In terms of managerial ownership, 
Simoneti andGregoric’s (2004) study on Slovenian firms in the post-privatization period does not provide 
relevant evidence of any positive effect that increasing managerial control have on firms’ performance. A 
study by Lu (2006) meanwhile, finds that former managers of China’s government-owned enterprises are 
generally capable of improving efficiency once they became new owners.  While governance practices such as 
adopting concentrated ownership is prevalent and found to have affected performance of Malaysia’s publicly 
listed companies (Tam and Tan, 2007) a more recent study, found that ownership concentration and 
managerial ownership provide insignificant effect (Zunaidah and Fauzias, 2008). In Malaysia, GLCs are seen 
playing diverse roles in attempting to maximise value while fulfilling its national and social obligations. Hence, 
this paper focuses on their productive efficiency instead of profitability or firm value.  
 
3. Government-Linked Companies in Malaysia 
 
The privatization master plan implemented in 1983, led to the setup of “Malaysia Incorporated” which initiative 
was to reduce the size of the public sector, and to improve the firms’ efficiency and productivity (Fifth Malaysia 
Plan [5MP] Mid-Term Review, 1989). It also includes the transfer of former state owned enterprises (SOEs) to 
private ownership and engage in profit oriented business concerns. As private transfers are minimal and equity 
ownership is still largely in the hand of the state, these firms are often known as government-linked companies. At 
the federal government level, the creation of GLCs was made via the Ministry of Finance (MOF) Inc. MOF invested 
heavily through its government-linked investment companies (GLICs), namely the government giant investment 
arm,  KhazanahNasionalBhd (Khazanah), Pension Fund (KWAP), Employees Provident Fund (EPF), the Armed 
Forces Fund (LTAT), PermodalanNasionalBhd (PNB), and the Pilgrims Fund (LTH). These institutional investors 
either directly hold ownership or control the GLCs (PCG, 2006).The GLC Transformation Manual produced by the 
Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance (PCG), defines GLCs as “…..companies that have commercial 
interest and in which the federal government has direct controlling stake”. This includes the government’s ability to 
appoint members of the Board of Directors and senior management and make major decisions for GLCs either 
directly or indirectly through its 100percent owned GLICs.  Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, GLCs have its 
share of less than impressive performance and has been subjected to public debate and political scrutiny. Their 
historical underperformance against the broader market, both financially and operationally, could risk derailing the 
government effort towards Vision 2020 (PCG, 2013).The government launched the Government-Linked Companies 
Transformation (GLCT) Programme in May 2004, with the main thrust of improving the GLCs performance as well 
as to enhance their governance. This ten-year programme (2005-2015) was also to ensure the GLCs remain 
sustainable and gradually become regional and global players. PCG was set up in January 2005 to follow through 
and catalyze the GLCT programme. The committee is currently chaired by the Prime Minister, by virtue of his 
position as the Finance Minister, with participation from the heads of 5 GLICs (namely Khazanah, EPF, LTAT, 
PNB, and LTH) and the Chief Executives from the selected GLCs.GLCs represent the majority components in the 
benchmarked Kuala Lumpur Composite Index, employ 5percent of the country’s total workforce, and provide key 
services to the community (PCG, 2008). The government’s ownership in GLCs and their seemingly diverse 
objectives in attempting to meet shareholders’ return and their commitment to other stakeholders, raise the 
perplexing issue of how sustainable these firms are in the wake of the competitive global trade and deregulation. In 
2007, there were 37 GLCs, having a total market capitalization of RM361 billion, and accounting for approximately 34 
percent of the total market capitalization (PCG, 2008). In the quest of improving performance, the GLCs were urged to 
unbundle some of their subsidiaries and to focus on their key business activities. The number continues to decline due 
to mergers, demergers, delisting and other corporate restructuring. By 2012, there were33 GLCs having the federal 
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government, though its institutional investors, the GLICs, as the substantial shareholder (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Government-Linked Companies by Selected Years and Market Capitalization 
 1995 2000 2005 2010 2012 
Number of GLCs 24 40 57 33 31 
Market capitalization of GLCs (RM billion) 124.7 131.1 430.0 402.2 451.2 
Total market capitalization (RM billion) 547.4 433.4 728.8 1,275.3 1,465.7 
% to Total market capitalization  22.8 30.3 59.0 31.5 30.8 
Source: Extracted and computed from the Malaysia Plans, PCG Progress Review Reports, World scope online, and Bursa Malaysia. 
 
4. Stochastic Frontier Model with Inefficiency Effects 
 
Productive efficiency is simply a measure to define the relationship between the firm’s input and output. A 
technically efficient firm is said to operate on the frontier, which represents the maximum output attainable from 
each input level, or beneath the frontier if they not technically efficient (Coelli et al., 2005). Efficiency improvement 
is observed if firms operating below the frontier move toward the production frontier and implies shrinkage of 
technical inefficiency, Uit over time. Given its resources (input),a firm might fall short of producing the maximum 
possible (frontier) output – a phenomenon popularly known as technical inefficiency. Such inefficiency may arise 
because of explanatory factors such as inadequate financial institutions, the nature and structure of corporate 
governance mechanisms, as well as inappropriate regulatory intervention (Kumbhakar and Wang, 2005). Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA) uses the parametric approach to estimate its production frontier. Different from the non-
parametric method, as in Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) which assumes a deterministic frontier, SFA allows for 
deviations from the frontier to represent both inefficiency and an inevitable statistic noise.In this study, we model 
ownership concentration and structure as factors that explain inefficiency, which can only be conducted using the 
parametric approach (Khatri et al., 2002). To measure for technical inefficiency effects of firms, we use the 
stochastic frontier production model proposed by Battese&Coelli (1995). The method uses panel data and derives a 
version that can explicitly express technical inefficiency effects in terms of appropriate explanatory and control 
variables. Although the SFA model has traditionally been used in production and industry-specific economics, they 
have been extended to study financial and governance issues (Khatri et al., 2002;  Baek & Jose, 2003; Khiari et al., 
2007). In our study, we argue that production efficiency can be related to ownership concentration and structure of 
the firm. 
 
5. Empirical Models 
 
The general form of the production frontier panel data version of Aigner et al (1977) and Battese and Coelli 
(1995) with technical inefficiency effects is stated as: 
 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߚ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ሺ ௜ܸ௧ െ ௜ܷ௧ )       (1) 
 
Where Yit denotes the output for the ith sample firm in the tth year); ௜ܺ௧is a (1 x K) vector of inputs; β is (K + 
1) vector of unknown parameters to be estimated;  ௜ܷ௧are non-negative random variables, assumed to account for 
technical inefficiency in production and assumed to be i.i.dN (0, ߪݑ௨ଶ) error terms and ௜ܸ௧, the stochastic variables 
which are assumed to be i.i.d.~N(0, ߪݒ௩ଶ) and independent of the u. The technical inefficiency effects, Uit,,in the 
stochastic frontier production function (1) is then specified in (2) below: 
 
௜ܷ௧ ൌ ܼ௜௧ఋ ൅  ௜ܹ௧       (2) 
 
Where ܼ௜௧ఋdenotes a vector of explanatory variables associated with technical; Wit is an error term that follows a 
normal distribution but has a variable truncation point at -ܼ௜௧ఋ , that is, ௜ܹ௧≥ -ܼ௜௧ఋ ;  δ  being the (1 + K) vector of the 
unknown coefficients. The maximum likelihood (MLE) method is used to simultaneously estimate the parameters in 
equations (1) and (2). As suggested by Battese and Corra (1977), the likelihood function is maximized in terms of 
the variance parameters σ2= σv2 + σu2 and γ = σu2/ σ2. The general idea here is by estimating equation (2) we will be 
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able to point out what facet of the explanatory variables directly influence technical efficiency.Before the model as 
in equation (1) and (2)are applied, we need to specify a suitable production function form which is estimated from 
the sample data. If the production relationship is incorrectly specified, this will affect the output of methods used 
such as SFA, which measures the efficiency of a firm’s or country’s production relative to the technically feasible 
maximum (Kneller & Stevens, 2003). In many cases efficiency differences are a function of inadequate models and 
data, even when the frontier is stochastic. Khatri et al (2002) mention this occurs when the functional form fitted is 
often using the restrictive Cobb-Douglasfunction. Thus, a number of studies normally test the adequacy of this 
functional form against a flexible one, such as the less restrictive translog function. Unlike the Cobb-Douglas 
function, the translog function does not necessarily satisfy concavity, monotonicity, or other important axioms of 
production. This functional form is relatively well behaved in panel data studies although it is more complex than 
the Cobb-Douglas functional form. We use the generalized likelihood ratio (LR) statistics2 to test if the Cobb-
Douglas production function is an adequate representation of the data, given the specification of the translog model. 
The production equation for Cobb-Douglas and translog functional forms are laid out in equation (3) and (4) 
respectively below: 
 
݈݊ ௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ݈݊ܮ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ܭ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷݐ ൅ ߚସܦ ൅ ሺ ௜ܸ௧ െ ௜ܷ௧ሻ    (3) 
 
݈݊ ௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ߚଵ݈݊ܮ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ܭ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷݐ ൅ ߚସ
ଵ
ଶ ሺ݈݊ܮሻ
ଶ ൅ ߚହ
ଵ
ଶ ሺ݈݊ܭሻ
ଶ ൅ߚ଺
ଵ
ଶ ሺݐሻ
ଶ ൅ ߚ଻݈݊ܮ݈݊ܭ ൅ߚ଼݈݊ܮ݈݊ܭ ൅
ߚଽ݈݊ܭݐ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܦ ൅ ሺ ௜ܸ௧ െ  ௜ܷ௧ሻ                   (4)
             
  In the inefficiency model, control variables and variables explaining ownership concentration and structure, are 
added as Zit as presented below: 
 
௜ܷ௧ ൌ ܼ௜௧ఋ ൌ  ߜ଴ ൅ߜଵܼଵ௜௧ ൅ߜଶܼଶ௜௧ ൅ߜଷܼଷ௜௧ ൅ߜସܼସ௜௧ ൅ߜହܼହ௜௧ ൅ ߜ଺ܼ଺௜௧ ൅  ௜ܹ௧ (5) 
 
௜ܹ௧ ǡrepresents the error term that follows a normal distribution but has a variable truncation point with zero mean 
and variance, ߪଶ. 
 
6. Data and Data Description 
 
As at March 2009, PCG recorded 33 GLCs which are listed at Bursa Malaysia. Due to unavailability of data, de-
listings and mergers, only 31 GLCs are included in this study. The dataset is an unbalanced panel with annual 
observations over a period of 12 years (2001-2009). All SFA estimations were obtained using the maximum 
likelihood method. We used the Frontier 4.1 software to obtain the MLE results. Our study uses accounting data 
where features can accommodate the different industries the firms represent. We obtain the data for output, 
labour and capital inputs, and market capitalization from ThomsonOne database. The rest of the data were 
hand collected from each firms’ annual reports. Table 2 describes the variables used in this study. 
 
Table 2. Summary of  Variables and Descriptions 
Variables:                         Measurements 
Production Function in the Efficiency Model 
Output, lnY: natural logarithm (ln) turnover (net revenue) (In RM Million) per year 
Input, lnL:  natural logarithm (ln) of labour input; staff cost and other expenses (in RM Million) per year.   
Input, lnK: natural logarithm (ln) of capital input; total assets value (in RM million) less any deferred tax assets per 
year. 
Industry,D:  dummy variable for industry; “1” for financial industry and “0” for non-financial industry 
Inefficiency Effect Model 
Firm Size, Z1: natural logarithm (ln) of year end market capitalization (in RM million) 
t or time trend, Z2 year of observations to account for time-varying inefficiency effect (Battese and Coelli, 1995; Battese and 
Broca, 1997). 
 
 
2 The likelihood ratio test is equal to 42(restricted - unrestricted), followed by a chi-squared distribution. 
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Ownership concentration, Z3: Extending the model used by Boubakri et al (2005), we measure concentration as the logistic transformation 
(log) to (L5/ (1-L5)), where L5 refers to the cumulative percentage shares held by shareholders with 5 
percent ownership or more. When the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance was established in 2000, all 
listed firms are required to disclose the list of substantial shareholders that is those that hold 5 percent 
ownership or more. Thus we use 5 percent ownership as the data is available from the year on. 
Government ownership, Z4 Cumulative direct shares held by the federal government through its GLICs, their nominees and wholyy 
owned subsidiaries. To avoid the biasness in static data, we follow Zunaidah and Fauzias (2008) that 
cumulate government ownership based on the top 30 shareholders disclosed in the firms’ annual reports. 
Board ownership, Z5 cumulative direct percentage shares owned by the board of directors and their immediate family members 
 
 
7. Empirical Results 
 
7.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics employed in estimating the stochastic frontier model. Except for 
ownership concentration index and percentage of managerial ownership, the rest of the variables show larger 
standard deviation compared to the mean, indicating variability of the samples.  
 
Table 3.Descriptive Data Statistics for Panel 2001 – 2012 (GLCs) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2 Efficiency Estimates  
 
Table 4 summarizes the diagnostic tests of the panel data and the estimated parameters in the SFA model. The 
result of the Breusch-Pagan Langrangian Multiplier (LM) test rejectsthe null hypothesis to accept the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) model. We used the Hausman test to discriminate between the Random Effect (RE) model and the 
Fixed Effect (FE) model. The result shows a value of 11.65 with a p-value of 0.1127>0.05, thus accepting the null 
hypothesis that the RE model is the best fit model. The test on multicollinearity, provides the mean Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) of 4.09 which is lower than the threshold value of 5, thus accepting the null hypothesis that 
multicollinearity is not present.Table 4 also shows the MLE estimates, given the specification of the stochastic 
frontier with inefficiency effects.To determine the functional form of the SFA model, the LR test provides a 
result that exceeds the critical value of 7.813, thus rejecting the null hypothesis that the Cobb-Douglas model 
is an adequate representation for the data. The second test is to determine whether neutral technical change is 
present given the specification of the stochastic frontier model with time-varying inefficiency effects. From the 
maximized log-likelihood values of the translog model, the LR test result is below the 5 percent critical value 
of 9.488, thus accepting the null hypothesis that there is no technical change. To test for the absence of 
inefficiency effects, we look at the variance parameter, γ, and the more robust LR statistics. The key parameter 
γ denotes the variance from the inefficiency component of the error term divided by the total variance, and is 
bounded by zero to one. If γ = 0, technical inefficiency is not present and the null hypothesis should be 
accepted; indicating also that the mean response function (OLS) is an adequate representation of the data. In 
this case, the LR test for the null hypotheses that γ = 0 and δ0 =δ1 = δ2 =δ3 = 0 is 76.64, far exceeds the 5 
percent critical value of 11.91 thus strongly rejecting the null hypothesis of no inefficiency effects (Coelli et al., 
2005).  
 
Variable (n = 31) 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Net sales/Revenue (RM million) 5476.0 7831.0 530.2 47 602.3 
Staff cost (RM million) 568.1 853.2 4.2 4565.2 
Total assets (RM million) 31 027.6 68 930.3 55.3 49 3567.4 
Market capitalization (RM million) 8785.0 13 992.4 2.1 77 648.4 
Ownership concentration L5/(1-L5) 2.3 1.5 0.3 8.1 
Government ownership (%) 57.2 25.4 0.6 96.0 
Board ownership (%) 1.4 6.8 0.0 74.4 
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Table 4. Summary of Diagnostic Tests and Parameters of the Frontier Model (P-Values In Parenthesis) 
Diagnostic tests for panel data 
 Pooled OLS Model RE Model FE Model 
Breusch and Pagan LM Test 116.28 (0.0000)***  
 H0: σ2λ = 0 :  variance across entities is zero; Reject H0 , thus  Pooled OLS Model is rejected 
Hausman Test  11.65  (0.1127) 
 H0: Cov (λi, xit) = 0: there is no covariance between the regressor and the firm specific effect; Accept H0 
Mean VIF 4.09 
 Mean VIF ≥=5; no collinearity between explanatory variables 
Hypothesis tests for SFA model 
Ho: βij = 0, i,j, = 1,…,3 
Critical value ݔ଴Ǥଽହଶ ሺ͵ሻ ൌ ͹Ǥͺͳͷ 
LR =  40.446 
Ho : linear form of the CD model is the adequate functional  form; Reject Ho 
Ho: β4 = βi4= 0, i = 1,…4 
Critical value ݔ଴Ǥଽହଶ ሺͶሻ ൌ ͻǤͶͺͺ 
LR = 6.416 
H0: there is no technical change; AcceptHo 
Ho: γ = 0 (t statistic) 0.005 (0.227) 
H0: there is no technical change; AcceptHo 
Ho: = γ = ߜ௜ ൌ Ͳ 
Critical value ݔ଺ଶ ൌ ͳͳǤͻͳ 
LR = 76.640 
H0: there is no technical change; Accept Ho 
No. of Observations 362 
Note: *, ** and *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
 
7.3 Technical Inefficiency Effects on Ownership Concentration and Structure 
  
Table 5 shows the efficiency estimates specified by the preferred translog with no technical change model. For 
the efficiency estimate, the sum of the two estimated elasticities(Labour and Capital) is 0.712, suggesting very mild 
decreasing returns to scale at the sample mean point over the 12-year period. We find significant and negative 
coefficient for labour input, suggesting labour congestion that could affect technical inefficiency. Likewise, the 
positive coefficient of the capital input shows investment in assets has contributed positively towards revenue 
generation. The finance sector coefficient is negative and significant, suggesting that inputs in the finance sector is 
contributing less towards revenue generation. The frontier analysis further analyzed the firm size, time trend, and 
ownership concentration and structure in the inefficiency components of the model. A positive coefficient in the 
inefficiency model indicates a positive relationship with inefficiency, and vice versa. The negative firm size 
coefficient suggests larger firms tend to be less inefficient (more efficient) than the smaller ones. The negative but 
low time coefficient indicates inefficiency has reduced marginally over time. The ownership variables in the 
inefficiency model are represented by ownership concentration, government ownership and managerial ownership. 
The government ownership coefficient is negatively minute but very significant, providing evidence that 
government ownership tends to reduce inefficiency (increase efficiency) over time.  Both the coefficients for 
ownership concentration and board ownership provide insignificant but positive result. This indicatesthat higher 
ownership concentration and board share ownership amongst the GLCs, has a positive effect on inefficiency (or 
negative effect on efficiency) over time. 
 
Table 5.Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Production Frontier with Inefficiency Effects(t-statistics in parenthesis) 
Parameter (n=31) Translog Frontier Model with No Technical Change  
β0 (intercept) 1.659**(1.937) 
β1 (lnL) -0.999*** (-3.659) 
β2 (lnK) 1.711*** (5.702) 
β3 (t) - 
β4 ½ (lnL2) -0.168 (-5.511) 
β5 ½ (lnK2) -0.363*** (-5.511) 
β6 ½ (t2) - 
β7 (lnL lnK) 0.286*** (5.193) 
β8 (lnL t) - 
β9 (lnK t) - 
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Β10 (Finance Sector) -0.062 (-0.449) 
Inefficiency components 
δ0 (intercept) 3.053*** (7.134) 
δ1 (Firm Size) -0.238*** (-4.476) 
δ2 (t) -0.005 (-0.378) 
δ3 (Ownership concentration) 0.109 (0.692) 
δ4 (Government ownership) -0.010*** (-5.811) 
δ5 (Board ownership) 0.005 (0.834) 
σ2 (variance of inefficiency) 0.307*** (10.575) 
gamma   γ =  
0.005 (0.227) 
No of observations 362 
Mean TE scores 0.582 
Note:  *, ** and *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
  
7.4. Efficiency Levels of GLCs 
  
Table 6 reports the trend of the mean efficiency levels and the dispersions over the 12-year period. These 
measures are derived from the stochastic frontier model with technical inefficiency effects, and represent the error 
term that is not stochastic. The mean efficiency level for all the firms stands at 47.9percent. The low estimated mean 
efficiency is anticipated amongst government controlled firms as output prices are low for a reason outside their 
control.  The mean efficiency level has increased gradually over the years, except for a slight decline in 2008. This 
is expected in an export based economy which is exposed to the global financial crisis that occurred during that 
period. The annual standard deviations have lower values that the mean indicating there is no adverse variability in 
the efficiency scores. However, this trend increases slightly over time, suggesting a widening in the mean efficiency 
range, thus implying efficiency improvement is slow.  
 
Table 6. Firm-Level Efficiency Estimates (2001 – 2009) 
 Year 
N=31 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Panel 
Annual Mean 0.505 0.506 0.532 0.556 0.555 0.577 0.612 0.608 0.621 0.637 0.633 0.645 0.582 
Standard 
Deviation 0.272 0.288 0.281 0.281 0.285 0.276 0.288 0.289 0.284 0.294 0.290 0.288 0.285 
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper attempts to explore the link between ownership structure and productive efficiency. The study 
applied the SFA methodology, specifically to estimate efficiency and relating it to ownership structure 
variables amongst government owned firms in Malaysia.The SFA model with inefficiency effects allow us to 
relate to good productive practices amidst different technology, and that efficient use of resources can be 
linked to firm sustainability. The results in the efficiency model manage to highlight that revenue generation 
amongst the GLCs has been labour using and capital saving over time.GLCs under the finance sector tend to 
contribute less towards maximizing output, thus highlighting the need for investment in more talent and 
productivity driven labour. Larger firms tend to be less inefficient, thus the need for downsizing the number of 
GLCs and continual divestment in their business activities.Large government share ownership empirically 
shows its significant presence in ensuring high performance amongst the GLCs. The results of this study 
confirmthe role that the government plays, in monitoring the performance of GLCs, is important to improve 
productive efficiency. Although insignificant, this study observes that highly concentrated shareholding, plus 
the present of complex pyramidal and cross-holding ownership amongst the GLCs can influence revenue 
inefficiency. The issue of whether equity stake owned by top non-independent managers can reduce agency 
cost is also inconclusive in this study. Since the Corporate Governance Code was launched in 2000, the direct 
equity shareholding amongst top executives has either declined drastically and almost inexistence in most 
government linked firms. 
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